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THE HIDDEN VIRTUES OF CHAPTER 11:
A N OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF F INANCIALLY DISTRESSED F IRMS
Douglas G. Baird*
I. THE DISTINCTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 shares many of its features with legal regimes in
other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 gives managers of a
financially distressed firm an unparalleled ability to control the
reshaping of the firm’s capital structure.1 The managers of financially distressed firms are the ones who typically begin the Chapter
11 process.2 Once the process is begun, the debt-collective efforts of
all creditors—including secured creditors—must cease. Payments to
creditors cease as well. The managers continue to run the day-to-day
operation of the business. With court approval, they can borrow
new funds and give these funds a priority over existing general
creditors.3 In most cases, the managers also control the process of
reorganization and are the only ones entitled to present a reorgani*

Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Dean,
University of Chicago Law School.
1
In principle, the managers’ fiduciary duty shifts to the creditors when a
firm becomes insolvent. See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621
A.2d 784 , 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co.,
692 F.2d 973, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983)
(“[W]hen the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the
directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors.”). In practice, however,
the managers suffer no penalties for delaying a bankruptcy, in distinct contrast
to some European jurisdictions. See White (1993).
2
This assertion must be qualified. Involuntary filings are possible, see 11
U.S.C. §303, but in practice they are rare. More significantly, a creditor may
push the managers into Chapter 11. (For example, the secured bank lender may
threaten to call on a personal guarantee if the managers do not file.) Even here,
however, the managers retain control over the timing of the decision.
3
The managers are known collectively as “the debtor in possession.”
Hence, these loans are known as “debtor-in-possession” financing or, more
colloquially, “dip” financing. See 11 U.S.C. §365.
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zation plan to the court.4 In many cases, the reorganization takes
several years. The reorganization plan can be confirmed over the
objection of general and secured creditors. As long as creditors
holding one class of impaired claims votes in favor of the plan, the
rights of all the other creditors can be readjusted over their objection
as long as various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are satisfied.5
We can find other jurisdictions in which managers possess one
or more of the powers they enjoy under Chapter, but not all of
them.6 The scope of the powers of the managers of a financially
distressed firm sets Chapter 11 apart. The ambition of any law of
corporate reorganizations is to prevent efforts to reorganize firms
that ought to be liquidated and promote efforts to reorganize firms
that are viable going concerns.7 For the last 15 years, law and
4

Section 1121 provides that the managers have presumptively four months
to submit a plan of reorganization and an additional two months to gain acceptance of a plan once it is submitted. In practice, however, the period is
routinely extended as long as the bankruptcy judge is unwilling to allow the
secured creditor to seize the firms assets and liquidate them. “Lifting the automatic stay” and terminating exclusivity typically amount to the same thing. A
bankruptcy judge is rarely inclined to do either if the firm continues as a going
concern and the debtor is making a good faith effort to resolve disputes among
different creditors and draft a plan that they will support. The typical plan,
once proposed, is amended a number of times.
5
These protections collectively are known as “the absolute priority rule.”
The process of imposing a plan over the objections of creditors holding a class
of claims is known as “cram down.” See 11 U.S.C. §1129.
6
Canadian law gives managers less time to put a reorganization plan i n
place and they lack the power to “cramdown” a plan over the objection of a
class of creditors. See LoPucki & Triantis (1994). A look at Japanese law tells a
similar story. See Eisenberg & Tagashira (1994). Unlike Chapter 11, the
Japanese composition proceeding does not have as sweeping the automatic stay
in §362 of the Bankruptcy Code and secured creditors have a much greater
ability to reach their collateral. See Composition Act §43. In addition, an examiner is appointed at the outset of a case to review the debtor’s financial
condition and advise the court about whether the case should proceed.
Composition Act §21. By contrast, in the typical Chapter 11, there is no
outsider to investigate the case and a review of the debtor’s suitability for
reorganization comes only later, if at all, when a creditor brings a motion to
lift the automatic stay.
7
Eisenberg & Tagashira (1994), LoPucki & Triantis (1994), and White
(1993) each offer comparative law approaches to Chapter 11 that focus on the
balance between ensuring that firms that should be liquidated are liquidated on
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economics scholars have focused on the question of whether
Chapter 11 and its bias in favor of trying to preserve firms as going
concerns makes sense.
The starting place for thinking about the law governing firms in
economic distress has been the idea of “the investors’ bargain.”8 The
law of corporate reorganizations, like corporate law more generally,
rests upon a network of contracts. We are all better off if we make it
easy for entrepreneurs to start firms. They will be able to do this only
if they can find capital. Capital is most available if investors can enter
into contracts with these entrepreneurs and be confident that they
will be enforced according to their terms. The law should provide
investors and entrepreneurs with the set of terms for which they
would have bargained had transaction costs been sufficiently low.9
Like the rules of corporate law, the law of corporate reorganization
should be the default terms for which parties would bargain most of
the time. Hence, the challenge that defenders of Chapter 11 face
lies in explaining why rational investors and entrepreneurs would,
before the fact, want such a legal regime.
This approach to Chapter 11 is strikingly different from that of
traditional academics and many of its practitioners. These scholars,
judges, and lawyers usually give lip-service to the absolute priority
rule and the need to recognize the rights for which the creditors
bargained. They go on, however, to argue that it is only one of
many values that Chapter 11 protects. Just what these other values
are is not always clear. Sometimes they seem to boil down to no
more than assertions that misery loves company and everyone should
“share the hurt.”
These values may reflect a distinctive characteristic of United
States law, which has always been solicitous of debtors. The first
the one hand and ensuring that viable firms remain as going concerns on the
other.
8
Jackson (1982) gives this idea its definitive formulation.
9
This formulation puts to one side obligations owed to tort victims and
other involuntary creditors. Law and economics scholars have not ignored this
problem. See, e.g., Roe (1984); Jackson (1986). Such obligations, however, do
not loom large in the capital structure of most firms. In any event, the
investors’ bargain model proves a useful tool in sorting through the kinds of
issues that these obligations raise. See, e.g., In re CMC Heartland Partners,
966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992).
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settlers of Georgia were themselves exiled debtors. During the colonial era, creditors could not levy on real property in Virginia. Even
today, creditors can not levy on an individual’s homestead in Texas,
defined to include both the dwelling and the acre surrounding it.
For whatever reason, however, many traditional scholars have not
accepted the paradigm with which most law and economics scholars
have begun and have shown little interest in their work beyond
attacking the first principles on which it rests.10
This paper focuses on the light that law and economics has shed
on Chapter 11 and the problem of firms in financial distress. It is
worth noting that this paper does not concern itself with the vast
majority of cases in the Chapter 11. Chapter 11 is often a way
station for firms that have ceased to operate as going concerns and
need to wrap up their affairs.11 In addition, many cases in Chapter
11 are single-asset real estate cases. An office building is owned by a
group of passive investors.12 A management company handles the
day-to-day operations, such as maintaining the building, finding
new tenants, and collecting the rent. If the real estate market
collapses and the rental income from the property no longer can
meet the debt service, the bank that holds the mortgage may
threaten to foreclose. Chapter 11 may be an attractive option to the
passive investors.13 Other cases involve firms whose outlook is so
bleak and whose obligation to a single secured creditor is so large
that Chapter 11 only postpones the secured creditor’s seizure of all
10
For a flavor of the approach that traditional bankruptcy scholars have
taken, see Warren (1987). These scholars also attack the methodology of the
law and economics scholars. In their view, the law and economics approach is
too reductionist, it fails to acknowledge market imperfections, and it focuses on
problems, such as the restructuring of giant corporations, that are only a small
part of the relevant universe. See Bufford (1994).
11
It might seem that there would be a state law procedure so that such
corporations, which are creatures of state law, could dissolve under state law.
Such laws never developed in the United States, perhaps because Chapter 11
handled them effectively
12
In the 1980s, these investors were often individuals with high disposable
incomes (such as doctors, dentists, and lawyers) looking for ways to shelter
income from federal taxation.
13
State laws governing the foreclosure on real property may be particularly
Byzantine. In addition, the investors may face particularly bad tax liabilities
from a state foreclosure relative to the ones they face in Chapter 11.
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the firm’s assets. Finally, individual debtors may file Chapter 11
petitions.14 The financially distressed firms on which we are
focusing may be no more than 10% of all the Chapter 11 cases that
are filed.15
The law and economics scholars who have studied corporate
reorganizations have given the debate about the virtues hard edges in
two ways. First, a number of scholars have proposed concrete
alternatives to Chapter 11, and a number of others have subjected
both Chapter 11 and the alternatives to close empirical scrutiny. I
introduce this literature in Part II and review it in Part III after
setting out a typology of firms in financial distress. Scholars are close
to closure in understanding how well Chapter 11 works in the case
of the large, publicly traded firm with a simple capital structure that
faces only financial distress, but not economic distress. Much work,
however, remains to be done in other types of cases.
Part IV shows that investors in the United States today can opt
out of Chapter 11 if they choose, but that they often do not. From
this observation, I argue that we may be able to draw the inference
that Chapter 11 possesses hidden virtues. Part V begins with the
premise that the benefits of Chapter 11 can be gleaned from an
examination of its origins. It reviews how Chapter 11 evolved out of
the equity receiverships used to reorganize railroads in the 19th
Century.
This review of Chapter 11’s origins leads me to suggest in Part
VI that the benefits of Chapter 11 may not lie in its ability to overcome collective action problems or the problems of illiquidity that
keep markets from working effectively, but rather from the way in
which it overcomes two obstacles facing those who have invested in
financially distressed firms: (1) their inability to gather information
about the firm; and (2) the need to resolve disputes about the
ownership of the firm’s assets before a new capital structure can be
put in place. The paper concludes with the observation that the
14
Such cases are often ones in which the manager-owner of a financially
distressed firm enters Chapter 11 at the same time as the firm because of a
personal guarantee that the manager-owner has made covering the firm’s
obligations to an institutional lender.
15
See Flynn (1989). In the face of evidence that suggests that most Chapter
11 cases do not involve financially distressed firms at all, some have argued
that Chapter 11 is an excellent way to liquidate firms. See Bufford (1994).
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largest challenge facing law and economics scholars may lie not so
much in discovering whether Chapter 11 provides net benefits relative to the alternatives, but rather in unbundling Chapter 11’s many
features and understanding which ones work and which ones do
not.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO CHAPTER 11
The most obvious alternative to Chapter 11 is an outright sale of
the firm’s assets to the person who bids the most for them.16 Instead
of overseeing bargaining among different groups of creditors, the
bankruptcy judge’s primary task is to find an auctioneer. As long as
the market is liquid, the assets end up in the hands of their highestvalued user and creditors and other investors are paid according to
the absolute priority rule. The sale can take place even if there are
the disputes among the creditors. (The proceeds of the sale can be
held in escrow until the bankruptcy judge resolves the dispute.) This
approach ensures that disputes about who owns the assets are neatly
separated from the question of how they are used.
There are at least three theoretical objections to auctions. First,
nothing under current law prevents an interested party from asking
the judge to hold an auction. Indeed, such auctions have been held
in Chapter 11 cases and have meet with conspicuous success.17
Arguing that auctions should replace Chapter 11 is in fact an argument for mandatory auctions and must rest on the idea that
investing judges with discretion in individual cases is a bad idea.18
Market sales are generally better than hypothetical ones, but this
does not itself make the case for eliminating Chapter 11, given that
Chapter 11 currently allows market sales if the parties want it.
In addition, there are reasons to think that market for financially
distressed firms will not be liquid, at least when there is private
information.19 Not only will creditors receive less than they would in
a reorganization, but the high bidder might not be the highest-value
16

This alternative is commonly described as an “auction,” although it need
not take the form of the traditional English auction. See Baird (1986).
17
The case of FNN is perhaps the best known. See Rackham (1991).
18
See Easterbrook (1990). I suggest why mandatory auctions might make
sense in Baird (1993).
19
See Gertner & Picker (1992).
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user of the asset. Such situations are especially likely to arise when
the firm is in a depressed industry.20
Finally, mandatory auctions put discretion in the hands of a
bankruptcy judge or someone else who does not have a financial
stake in the outcome. An auction can take many forms, ranging
from a traditional English auction to something resembling an initial public offering. Ordinarily, the person who decides how the
auction is to be conducted is the residual owner of the assets. When
a firm is financially distressed, however, the identity of the residual
owner may not be clear and, even if it is, the residual owner may be a
group of diversified creditors who have no way to act as one. A
number of scholars have suggested reforms of Chapter 11 that try to
introduce market mechanisms into the law of corporate reorganizations and still avoid the deficiencies of mandatory auctions. The two
most important are proposals of Bebchuk and of Aghion, Hart, and
Moore.
Bebchuk suggests that a recapitalization of a financially distressed
firm be implemented through the issuance of options. Upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, the most senior investors receive
equity interests in the firm and junior investors receive options. The
options are structured to ensure that the options are worth exercising
only if the value of the firm is greater than what is owed all the
investors with claims senior to the person exercising the option.
Assume that we have a firm whose value is uncertain. A senior
creditor is owed $100, a hundred junior creditors are owed $1 each,
and a hundred investors hold the firms equity. Under Bebchuk’s
scheme, the senior creditor is given 100 shares of stock. Each junior
creditor has the option to buy a share of stock from the senior
creditor for $1. Each equityholder has the option to buy a share of
stock for $2.
If the firm is worth less than $100, junior investors will not
exercise their options. This is the correct outcome. Under these
facts, the senior creditor is the residual owner of the firm and should
hold all the equity. If the firm is worth more than $100, but less
than $200, the junior creditors will exercise their options, but not
20

See Shleifer & Vishny (1992). Empirical evidence may bear this out.
Those who buy assets from firms in Chapter 11 tend to be in the same
industry. See LoPucki & Whitford (1993b) at 764.
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the shareholders. The senior creditors will receive $100 and the
junior creditors will own the firm. Again, this is the correct result.
The senior creditor is paid in full and has nothing to complain
about. Nor do the equityholders. The firm is insolvent if it is worth
less than $200 and the junior creditors are the residual owners. If the
firm is worth more than $200, the equityholders will exercise their
options. All creditors are paid in full and the equityholders own the
firm.
Bebchuk’s elegant proposal avoids the expenses of a full-scale
auction. Moreover, it accommodates the preferences of individual
investors. If the junior creditors disagree about whether the firm is
worth $100, those who think it is will exercise their options and
those who do not will not. Finally, Bebchuk’s approach overcomes
some of the liquidity problems that a mandatory auction of the
entire firm might generate. Even if there is no single person willing
to buy the entire firm, Bebchuk’s proposal may still ensure that the
assets are sold for their full value. Equityholders and junior creditors
who lack the resources to exercise the options can sell them to
someone who does. Competition among these investors for the
options ensures that they are priced fairly.
Bebchuk’s approach, however, still does not overcome all
liquidity problems. Managers may possess private information about
the value of the firm and lack the resources to participate in the
auction. Third party investors may have the resources, but not the
information. Bebchuk’s scheme also depends crucially, in a way that
a mandatory auction does not, on knowing who the creditors are,
their priority relative to each other, and the value of their claims.
Aghion, Hart and Moore have suggested an ingenious approach
that, like an auction, takes advantage of the market, but, like
Chapter 11, allows for the old managers to take the lead in restructuring the firm when the assets are worth more in their hands than
in anyone else’s. They too would give the most senior creditors the
equity of the firm and allow those junior to them to exercise options
along lines similar to Bebchuk. After this process identifies the
residual owners of the firm, the process reaches its second stage.
Anyone, including the old managers, may propose a plan of reorganization to the residual owners. The reorganization may be as simple
as a cash bid for the firm, or it may be a detailed plan of reorganization in which the residual owners hold bonds and other debt
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instruments, while the old managers continue to run the firm. The
plan might provide them with equity or give them options to acquire
it. The residual claimants presumably will favor such a noncash bid
when, but only when, the firm is worth more in the managers’
hands than anyone else’s.
The options are used only to identify a group that chooses
among different reorganization plans. Therefore, those holding
disputed claims lose relatively little as long as the different plans set
aside a cash reserve or otherwise ensured that their claims were
treated as well as those who were similarly situated. Given that the
holders of the undisputed claims are deciding only what plan maximizes the value of the firm, they have no incentive to act contrary to
the interests of those holding disputed claims.
This scheme also makes it possible for managers and others who
might face liquidity constraints to acquire control when they are, in
the view of the residual claimants, the highest valued users. This
proposal, however, may still not take sufficient account of the
problem of private information. As long as the old managers possess
private information about the value of the firm, the residual owners
may have no way of assessing the value of a noncash bid.
III. A TYPOLOGY OF FINANCIALLY D ISTRESSED FIRMS
Firms in financial distress are radically different from one
another. Any discussion of the relative merits of Chapter 11 and
other regimes must take these into account. There seem to be three
characteristics that set financially distressed firms apart from one
another.21 First, we want to know something about the size of the
firm, the composition of the investors, and the degree and separation between owners and managers. In Chapter 11, we see the
large, publicly traded firm in which managers own only a small sliver
21

A formal model of the costs of different corporate reorganization regimes
could be based upon this typology. Some empirical data might have to be
gathered, however, to assess the relative costs of different regimes for the
different types of firms. There are a number of complications. The distribution
of different types of firms will itself vary with the legal regimes. We should,
for example, expect more firms with complex capital structures in a legal system
that can sort out the rights of different investors at low cost. One can also
argue that this typology does not take sufficient account of private information.
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of the equity to the small firms in which the managers hold virtually
all the equity.
Second, we need to know the firm’s economic distress (whether
its assets are being put to their best use) as opposed to its financial
distress (whether it can meet its obligations to its investors). 22 A firm
might be liable in tort for injuring thousands of individuals from a
product it ceased selling decades before. This firm might be
hopelessly insolvent and have liabilities vastly in excess of its assets.
Nevertheless, there may be no problems with the ongoing operations of the firm. The firm’s only problem is financial distress, not
economic distress. There is no need to change its operations. At the
other end of the spectrum is a business, such as a restaurant that has
no customers. The firm may have no value as a going concern. If it
is to survive, it must radically change the way it does business,
starting perhaps with a new chef.
Third, firms in financial distress have different kinds of capital
structures. Some firms have ones that make it a simple matter to
identify how much each investor is owed and what priority each
investor enjoys relative to all the others. Other firms have complex
capital structures. These are firms whose owners are hard to set out
on a traditional balance sheet. Obligations may be disputed or tangled with its operations in a way that makes them hard to identify.
Obligations owed the government as a result of environmental
regulations are good examples.
Even firms with seemingly straightforward balance sheets may
have complex capital structures. Consider, for example, a firm that is
in financial distress because of a leveraged buyout. The bank that
financed the transaction asserts that it has a senior security interest
in all the firm’s assets, but the junior creditors claim that the bank’s
security interest is void because the leveraged buyout was a fraudulent
conveyance.23 A firm may face environmental liabilities of uncertain
size. There is a patent dispute and the stakes are equal to the value of
all the firm’s other assets. The firm has many secured creditors, each
with an interest in assets that are essential to keeping the firm intact
as a going concern. The value of each secured creditor’s claim relative
22

See Bulow & Shoven (1978); White (1980).
See Baird & Jackson (1985); Baird (1990).

23
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to the other is unclear. For these and many other reasons, it may be
hard to know who owns what.
The most straightforward type of firm in financial distress is the
large, publicly traded firm with a simple capital structure that is in
financial distress only. Much of the empirical work to date has
focused on this kind of firm.24 Even though these cases form only a
small fraction of all the Chapter 11 cases brought, the total assets
involved in these cases is large.25 For such firms, Chapter 11 seems
hard to justify. Markets would seem to work effectively here and
problems of liquidity and private information seem unlikely.
The empirical evidence that has emerged over the last decade,
however, suggests that Chapter 11’s deficiencies in this context may
have been exaggerated. The direct costs of bankruptcy for these
firms seems relatively small. A Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is
the equivalent of complete resolution of all the firm’s outstanding
legal disputes combined with an offering of all the debt and equity
of the firm at the same time. For publicly traded firms in Chapter 11
in the 1980s, direct bankruptcy costs ranged between 0.9 and 7% of
the book value of the assets before the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. The average was 2.8%.26 By contrast, the direct cash costs
of initial public offerings for amounts greater than $10 million were
about 10%.27
A restructuring in bankruptcy may be more akin to a private
placement. Yet the costs of a private placement for even a large,
well-known firm is not dramatically less, on a percentage basis, than
the direct costs observed in large Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Moreover, the costs of Chapter 11 seem in line with the costs of
leveraged buyouts of large firms that also involved reforming a firm’s
24
See LoPucki & Whitford (1993a); Weiss (1990). The paper in the law
and economics of Chapter 11 that perhaps has garnered the most vitriolic
attacks is also an empirical study of large firms. See Bradley & Rosenzweig
(1992).
25
See Flynn (1989).
26
See Weiss (1990). White (1984) suggests that the direct costs of
bankruptcy are comparable even for smaller firms.
27
See Ritter (1987) at 272-73. A large part of the costs of the initial public
offering, however, involve complying with the securities laws and these are not
faced in Chapter 11. In addition, some cash outlays may be rents captured by
investment bankers and not social costs.

CHICAGO W ORKING PAPER IN L AW & E CONOMICS

12

capital structure. To the argument that investment bankers could, in
principle, sell securities in the reorganized firm, one can respond
that, even if they could, a hypothetical sale inside of Chapter 11 is
cheaper. Finally, even if the costs of Chapter 11 seemed high relative
to the costs of auctions or the other alternatives to Chapter 11, one
has to make sure that one is looking at only the Chapter 11 costs
associated with changing the firms capital structure, not costs such
as resolving disputes among the various players. These costs are
incurred under all the different approaches.
One can argue that market-based alternatives to Chapter 11
eliminate the indirect costs of bankruptcy, particularly the costs that
arise from a prolonged stay in Chapter 11.28 The evidence here is less
substantial, but still suggests that the costs are smaller than usually
estimated for large firms with simple capital structures that are not
in economic distress. First, the separation of ownership and control
in firms of this type dramatically reduces the problem of managerial
entrenchment. The senior managers of publicly traded firms in
financial distress typically lose their jobs. For example, fewer than
10% of the CEOs in place 18 months before the filing of the
petition are still around six months after the reorganization is over.
Indeed, the turnover rate of those hired to replace them is several
times the rate of turnover for large, publicly traded firms generally.29
Determining the magnitude of bankruptcy costs, however, is
hard, in large part because the indirect costs may be much larger
than the direct costs.30 We do see huge indirect costs in such large
reorganizations as Eastern Airlines. The Eastern reorganization
proved costly, however, because the firm was in economic as well as
financial distress. The airline could not find its niche in the relevant
market and might in fact have been worth more if it had been
28

White (1983).
See LoPucki & Whitford (1993b) at 723-37. Gilson (1989) at 248 suggests a smaller, but still substantial turnover rate for the managers of distressed
firms. To say this, however, is not to say that the managers are pursuing the
interests of the firm as a whole. Although the creditors’ committee and the
postpetition lender may be able to exercise control indirectly, the shareholders
nominally continue to control the managers. The managers, at least in some
cases, openly embrace the idea that their duty lies with the shareholders. See
LoPucki & Whitford (1993b) at 745.
30
See White (1983).
29
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broken up. Bankruptcy costs may be low for large firms that are in
financial distress, but not economic distress. The best examples are
firms that went through leveraged buyouts in the late 1980s and
then could not meet their fixed obligations. In the case of Federated,
the indirect costs of bankruptcy seem to have been less than 10% of
the value of its assets.31
It is worth considering the conclusions that would follow if in
fact Chapter 11 was an effective way of restructuring large firms
with simple capital structures that were in only financial distress, but
not economic distress. If this were indeed the case, the case for replacing Chapter 11 with more market-based alternatives becomes
hard. The market-based alternatives are easiest to justify on theoretical grounds in this context, because objections based on complexity
of the capital structure and the illiquidity of the assets are largely absent. If the empirical data suggests that they are not likely to work
improvements in this context, one must explain why they are likely
to do so in other contexts in which it is easier to find weaknesses in
them.
We can get a sense of the problems that we shall have assessing
alternatives to Chapter 11 in other types of cases by returning again
to Bebchuk. His proposal becomes harder to implement when the
firm has a complex capital structure, is closely held, or is in financial
distress. A regime of options depends crucially upon a simple capital
structure in which there is little doubt about what each investor is
owed and the priority each enjoys. Assume that the only asset is a
machine with custom dyes. One creditor has a security interest in
31

See Kaplan (1989); Kaplan (1994a); Kaplan (1994b). Kaplan’s work to date
focuses only on Federated and one must be careful not to draw too many
inferences from it. Kaplan is preparing a follow-up study that looks at other
large firms that were financially distressed, but not economically distressed.
One should also note that the Texaco bankruptcy may present a
counterexample. Texaco’s bankruptcy case ended much more quickly than
anyone expected, and the rise in its stock price when the bankruptcy
proceeding ended suggests that investors thought that an extend bankruptcy
might be quite costly. See Mnookin & Wilson (1989); Cutler & Summers
(1988). The rise, however, was so large (in the neighborhood of $2 billion)
that some suspect that the price rise might have been because of an anticipated
takeover that did not materialize.
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the machine and the other in the dyes. Bebchuk’s scheme does not
tell us how to create options in this context.
When a firm is large, securities laws ensure that information
about the firm is available to investors. Even if the investors are not
large, a market will come into being for the options if the firm is
large enough. Problems appear, however, when a firm is small. First,
the lack of separation between equityholders and managers makes
the existence of private information more likely. Second, those who
hold the junior claims may not have the resources to exercise their
options and a market for the options may not come into being.
Bebchuk’s scheme is no harder to implement when the firm is in
economic distress, but firms in economic distress need tending. The
time needed to implement the option system—perhaps a number of
months—may prove costly if decisions need to be made about the
firm. Once the options have been exercised, we are left with a firm
whose capital structure is likely suboptimal and whose economic
distress is likely greater than it had been when Chapter 11 began.
For large, financially distressed firms with simple capital structures and little or no economic distress, Bebchuk’s approach, like
Aghion, Hart and Moore’s may work well, but Chapter 11 may
work here as well. Moreover, these cases may be less important than
is commonly thought. To be sure, the size of the assets involved
with publicly traded firms make large bankruptcies important, even
if there are few of them. Many of the firms in Chapter 11, however,
are in economic distress.32 In addition, we may overestimate the
number of firms with simply capital structures. A firm that has been
through a leveraged buyout has a complex capital structure given that
the claims of senior lenders may be void under fraudulent conveyance law. LTV faced billions in potential liability to workers and
retirees, as well as environmental claims. These all need to be sorted
out before we can know who owns what.
We may need to redirect our focus to other types of firms, our
focus may change. The need to exploit market mechanisms may not
32

LoPucki and Whitford’s data suggest that even in the case of large
publicly traded firms almost half needed not only a new capital structure, but
also a dramatic change in the way they did business. By their count, only 22 of
the firms in their sample of 43 emerged from Chapter 11 with their core
business intact. LoPucki & Whitford (1993a).
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loom as large. When there is much dispute about the rights of the
various players, an ability to resolve disputes and offer clear title to
the assets may be what matters the most. In the rest of this paper, I
explore how Chapter 11 may be well-adapted to the challenges of
gathering information and clearing title. The test for alternative
regimes may lie not so much in the way in which they incorporate
market mechanisms, but the way in which they handle these
problems.
IV. DRAWING INFERENCES FROM THE FAILURE
TO OPT OUT
The bedrock of United States corporate law is contractual. Each
state has its own corporate law and large firms were more or less free
to choose the state in which they are incorporated. The state of
incorporation need not be the jurisdiction in which the headquarters
lies nor need it do any business there. States compete for corporate
charters and the revenues they bring. The effect of many different
corporate laws gives prospective investors in firms a large menu from
which to choose their rights and obligations. Because many states
allow investors to depart from the various provisions of their corporate codes, the choice facing individual investors is larger still. This
“race to the bottom” has had powerful beneficial effects on corporate
law in the United States.33
If it makes sense to allow investors to choose among different
rules governing the creation and life of an enterprise, one can argue
that they should be able to choose the rules governing its reorganization as well.34 Even if one is agnostic about whether Chapter 11
makes sense, there seems little reason not to let investors choose
among different options and let them opt in or out of Chapter 11 as
they see fit. Even the more modest solution of granting states the
power to enact their own law of corporate reorganizations would
seem a step in the right direction.35
This theoretical objection reenforces the objection that Chapter
11 relies unnecessarily on nonmarket valuation mechanisms.
Nevertheless, these objections should not lead us to overlook an
33

See Easterbrook and Fischel (1991).
See Adler (1993); Rasmussen (1992).
35
See Skeel (1994).
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inference we may be able to draw from the failure of investors to opt
out of Chapter 11. The net cost of Chapter 11 cannot exceed the
costs investors must incur to opt out of Chapter 11 at the time they
make their initial investments. If we can establish that the opt-out
costs are low, we can infer from the decision of some investors to
create firms that are eligible for Chapter 11 that its benefits are at
least equal to its costs.
Blackletter law provides that a corporate debtor cannot waive its
right to file a bankruptcy petition. Many have therefore assumed
that “opting out” of bankruptcy is not possible. In fact, however,
there are many ways to structure transactions that are economically
equivalent to opting out. To start with the simplest case, a
bankruptcy proceeding assumes the existence of debt and much
entrepreneurial activity can take place without it. An absence of
traditional debt is in fact commonplace. Nearly one-third of all
closely held corporations have no institutional debt.36
Indeed, one of the hardest problems in corporate
reorganizations—the one that arises when much of the value of the
firm is in the firm-specific skills of the owner-manager—may arise
infrequently in practice because such ventures are often not financed
with debt. Many projects in high technology industries, such as
computer or bioengineering, are financed through limited partnerships with venture capitalists that have no debt. When these firms
fail, there are never going to be bankruptcy petitions.
There are, of course, benefits from including debt in a firm’s
capital structure.37 Debt can serve as a bonding device and show to
outsiders that the firm is doing well. A firm’s ability to meet fixed
obligations reveals information that is otherwise hard to convey.
Assessing the costs and benefits of having debt, however, is no
simple matter. In a reorganization, for example, the same private
information that makes debt financing attractive before the fact
makes debt less attractive when the firm is in reorganization.
Moreover, there are ways to ensure that investors never find
themselves in bankruptcy court even when they are creditors. Recent
years have seen the development of investment vehicles that are
36

See Petersen and Rajan (1993) (28% of closely held corporations have no
institutional debt).
37
See Hart and Moore (1995).
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“bankruptcy remote.”38 Let us assume that a group of investors wants
to lend to a firm, but wants to ensure that if the firm encounters
financial distress, the reorganization will not take place in Chapter
11, but rather will follow the procedures they set up in their debt
contract. Instead of lending money directly to the firm, they can
create an independent entity to which they give money and which
in turn makes equity investments in the firm. The entity itself can
be run by third parties. Even if it is run by the underlying firm, the
entity’s by-laws can provide that the entity can file a bankruptcy
petition only if all its independent directors approve.
The lenders can each sign covenants not to file an involuntary
petition against the entity. The loan agreement spells out exactly
what happens in the event that the underlying firm does not have
sufficient income to provide the entity with enough to meet the
obligations under the loan. Those who operate the entity will have
no stake in the underlying operating entity and hence no incentive
to file a bankruptcy petition. The promise not to file an involuntary
petition is probably enforceable.39 Moreover, if the entity is set up as
a trust, it is not even eligible to file a bankruptcy petition.40 For good
measure, the investors can ask the principals of the firm to sign a
guarantee that obliges them to pay them in full in the event that
either the trust or the firm enters bankruptcy. The underlying firm
has no creditors, cannot become insolvent, and will never find itself
in Chapter 11.
These “bankruptcy remote vehicles” are typically used for a
specific purpose, such as securitization of accounts receivable, not to
insulate the underlying firm from Chapter 11 completely, but it
could in principle used more broadly. If these forms become widely
used, we may infer that Chapter 11 does bring substantial costs. But
if they do not, we should ask if there are special virtues to Chapter
11 that are not readily apparent.
At the outset, one must be careful about drawing too many
inferences from the observation that investors today routinely make
investments that are not bankruptcy remote. The costs of opting out
may still be large enough to dissuade parties from doing it. Opting
38

See Graf (1995) at B16; Schwarcz (1993) at 16-27.
Schorer and Rosenberg (1994).
40
See In re Secured Equipment Trust, 38 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1994).
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out of Chapter 11 requires a certain amount of lawyering and some
of the methods need to be tested in the courts. The various
techniques may not have had time to develop.41
Only in recent years has Chapter 11 proved itself a viable vehicle
for managers. Hence, it is possible that opting out is only beginning
to take place and that it will take some time before the costs of opting out are low enough to make it routine. The transaction costs of
opting out typically involve creating multiple corporations, drafting
particular by-laws and granting secured creditors a special set of
rights. This must also be done in a way that navigates various problems under the tax laws, such as ensuring that transfers between the
firm and the entity that shields the creditors do not trigger tax
liability.
Moreover, until a large number of alternatives to Chapter 11
firmly establish themselves in the legal landscape, investors who opt
out of Chapter 11 face legal risks and uncertainties that those who
remain eligible do not. The creation of a bankruptcy remote vehicle
and shepherding it through a reorganization creates a positive
externality. If individual investors do not benefit enough from
opting out of Chapter 11 could remain a standard that is not
displaced, even though investors as a group would be better off if the
default rule were something else.42
In addition, we have to remember that Chapter 11 possesses
special rules that offer benefits to creditors as well as to managers.
Chapter 11 provides firms with favorable tax treatment and
sometimes an ability to evade government regulation and enjoy
assets that they do not enjoy outside of bankruptcy. For this reason,
Chapter 11 may work to the advantage of creditors as well as
managers. It may be valuable to creditors simply because it undoes an
efficiency created elsewhere. For example, the Trust Indenture Act
41

The incentive to opt out may have changed in 1978. Before the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, a corporate reorganization may have been sufficiently
unattractive to managers that investors did not see a need to opt out. Under
Chapter X, the managers had to turn control of the firm over to a trustee;
under Chapter XI, junior creditors and shareholders lacked the ability to
impose a plan of reorganization that would impair the rights of secured
creditors.
42
See Klausner (1995) at 766 n.25.
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makes it impossible to restructure bonds outside of bankruptcy.43 For
all these reasons, investors may prefer Chapter 11 to the alternatives,
even though its costs (including the costs it imposes upon third
parties) exceed its benefits.
Investors may also decide against opting out because the costs of
Chapter 11 may be small. As we have already noted, most cases in
Chapter 11 have little to do with reorganizing firms. Many firms in
Chapter 11 are worth reorganizing and have few assets. When a
service firm, such as an ad agency, fails, there are no assets for
creditors. For such firms, Chapter 11 (often subsequently converted
into Chapter 7) may be as good a way of wrapping up the affairs of
the business as any other. The costs of opting out in every case may
exceed the costs of Chapter 11 in the minority of cases in which the
firms can survive as going concerns, but need to be reorganized.
Moreover, once investors understand the peculiarities of Chapter 11,
they can structure their own investments to minimize the costs it
imposes on them.44
For all these reasons, we may be able to infer that Chapter 11 is
not terribly costly for creditors even if it brings no special benefits to
the financially distressed firm. Nevertheless, it is important to
identify what benefits these might be if they did exist. The next part
of the paper shows how the equity receivership lowered transaction
costs for the investors in railroads in the 1890s and its virtues may be
ones that Chapter 11 possesses, but that have been long neglected.
V. EQUITY RECEIVERSHIPS AND THE O RIGINS OF
CHAPTER 11
The United States law of corporate reorganizations took on its
basic features in the 1890s. It was shaped in large part by a small
number of bankers and lawyers who represented investors who had
43

See Roe (1987).
To give a simple example, Chapter 11 recognizes the time value of a
secured creditor’s claim only if the secured creditor is oversecured. Hence,
creditors have an incentive to ensure that their loans are smaller relative to the
value of the collateral than they would be otherwise. In the end, creditors are
no worse off and the firm as a whole suffers only from the loss of some of the
benefit of secured credit. For a more extensive discussion of these and other
issues, see Baird (1994).
44
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put their capital in railroads that could not meet their debt obligations.45 These bankers and lawyers used a particular legal
mechanism, the equity receivership, to reorganize these railroads and
the equity receivership is the direct ancestor of modern Chapter 11.
These bankers and lawyers had strong incentives to further the
interests of those they represented and they faced relatively low
transaction costs working together. For this reason, we may be able
to infer that the equity receivership, at least relative to the alternatives, was an efficient way to reorganize a large corporation.46
Railroads were the first giant privately financed corporations. At
first, railroads could be financed by the farmers and merchants who
lived near the proposed track and who would benefit from its
construction. By 1860, however, private investment in railroads exceeded a billion dollars, and the entrepreneurs who built the roads
had to seek capital from New York and the commercial centers of
Europe. The great capitalists such as the Vanderbilts and the
Forbeses and their associates invested in the railroads and then investment bankers such as J.P. Morgan, August Belmont, and Kidder
Peabody found capital in the large commercial centers of Europe.
These investment bankers sat on the boards of the various railroads
and represented the interests of their European investors.47 Because
they counted on repeated dealings with these investors, they had the
incentive to represent them well.
The period between 1865 and 1890 was one of enormous
growth for the railroads. The period also saw the consolidation of
different lines in haphazard and unpredictable ways. Over 75,000
miles of track was laid down in the 1880s and this was a time of
increasing competition.48 Moreover, there was at the same time
45
In 1893 alone, 27,000 miles of track in the United States went into
receivership, more than existed in all of Britain at that time. Daggett (1908) at
v; Chandler (1990) at 53. J.P. Morgan took the lead in reorganizing the Santa
Fe, the Erie, and the Northern Pacific among others. Chandler (1977) at 171.
46
Easterbrook goes much further than this. In Easterbrook (1990), he
suggests that the political environment is one in which legislatures were not
subject to special interest group pressures. He then draws the inference that
Chapter 11 is likely to be efficient.
47
Chandler (1977) at 146.
48
For a discussion of the competition among railroads connecting Chicago
with New York during this period, see Cronon (1991) at 81-93.
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increasing government regulation, the most important of which was
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Competition among the
different lines intensified, cartels came into existence and then fell
apart. At the same time, the early 1890s brought on one of the
United States’s worst economic downturns. All these factors created
an industry that by the mid-1890s was insolvent. Most of the
railroads that had been built could not meet their fixed obligations.
Over half of all the railroad tracks in the United States went
through reorganization during this period, some more than once.
The railroads as a group possessed a number of characteristics
that make them different from the firms that typically enter
Chapter 11 today. First, these railroads were worth keeping intact as
going concerns. Once a railroad is built, much of the cost is sunk
and there are no alternative uses for the assets (the long strips of real
property, the rails, the bridges, and the ties). It might make sense to
sell off parts to other roads or to acquire lines from others, but the
basic shape of the firm would remain unchanged. By contrast, firms
that are self-evidently worth keeping intact as going concerns
occupy only a small part of the modern Chapter 11 landscape.
Second, railroads had a capital structure that was quite different
from what we see today. Most firms in Chapter 11 owe large
amounts to their suppliers. This unsecured trade debt looms large in
the capital structure and dealing with suppliers is one of the major
problems in the typical Chapter 11. By contrast, railroads had little
in the way of short-term debt. Suppliers of coal and the like were
paid on an ongoing basis. Because these obligations were small
relative to the amounts owed the investors and because their
cooperation was important to keeping the railroad running, these
suppliers were typically paid in full at the outset and they would play
no role in the reorganization.49
Because the creditors of the 19th Century were largely institutional investors represented by a handful of bankers, the negotiation
problem that a railroad confronted when it needed to be reorganized
seems tractable. The capital structure of the railroads, however, was
often Byzantine. Individual railroads were built in segments. Often
49

It was called the “six-months rule” because the practice was to pay debts
for labor and supplies incurred in the ordinary course in the six months before
the reorganization began. See Fosdick v. Schall 99 U.S. 235 (1878).
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the costs of a segment were underestimated and there would be
several layers of mortgages for each segment. When railroads
merged, investors of each road would continue to hold security
interests on discrete assets.
We did not have textbook capital structures with neatly layered
hierarchical layers of ownership beginning with bonds, debentures,
subordinated debentures, preferred equity, and common equity.
Instead, there were often many different kinds of secured creditors.
The problem in the reorganization was first to put a value on the
rights of the different kinds of creditors. One would have to assess
the value of a $1,000 bond secured by a third mortgage on a trunk
line relative to a $1,000 bond secured by a first mortgage on a spur.
After one acquired a sense of the relative worth of each bond,
the investors as a group needed to settle on a capital structure that
was both simpler and one that took better account of the
uncertainties in the income the road might generate. In 1889, the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe had become a railroad that
connected the American Southwest with the west coast, the Gulf
coast, and Chicago. The system had 7,010 miles of track, almost
half of what existed in Britain at the time. There were 41 classes of
bonds and the outstanding indebtedness was $164 million. There
were revenues of $28 million and operating expenses of $22
million.50 The net earnings were insufficient to pay fixed interest
costs and would likely remain so.51
Bringing about a successful reorganization was hard. The value
of the railroad had to be estimated against a background of rapid
technological and regulatory change. Moreover, the claim of the
many different kinds of bondholders turned on how much their
collateral contributes to the earnings of the railroad as a whole.
50

Daggett at 198-200.
During the course of two reorganizations over the next six years, the
classes of bonds were reduced to two, one of these paid interest only if earned,
and the term of the bonds was extended. There was also an issue of preferred
stock. See Daggett at 213. The new capital structure proved sound, and the
railroad thrived in subsequent years. The principal on the last of the bonds
issued in the second reorganization in 1895 will be paid in full this October.
See Floyd Norris, “After 114 Years, It’s Payday,” New York Times at 17 (July
1, 1995).
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There might have been ways to use the market to provide
information on the first question, but not the second.
The investors confronted these problems in a legal landscape
that offered no easy way to sort out their problems. A common law
“composition” is a procedure that allows for creditors to give up a
portion of their claim. The common law composition, however,
provided no means to overcome the hold-out problem. A few
dissenting creditors could prevent a reorganization from going
forward and a unanimous consensus among all the investors was not
possible. Common law compositions work best in small
communities in which there are only a few investors and they are
likely to have repeated dealings with each other and with the
insolvent firm. (A supplier might be willing to compromise its claim
if the alternative is to lose a customer going forward.)
In most jurisdictions outside the United States, the legislature
enacts a scheme the provides creditors with a discrete set of rights
against an insolvent firm. In the United States at the end of the
19th Century, however, no legislative scheme was in place. The
United States has a legal tradition that is firmly wedded to the idea
of dual sovereignty, even more so in the 19th Century than in the
20th. The state and federal government each had their own spheres
of power. Powers enjoyed by one, even if unexercised, could not be
employed by the other. In this case, the Constitution gives to
Congress the power to enact “uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies” and prohibits states from “impairing the obligations of
contract.”
During the period in which the great railroads were reorganized,
states lacked the power to enact a law of corporate reorganization, at
least not where some of the investors resided in another state as was
always the case with large railroads. The Federal Constitution, as it
was understood at the time, treated any nonconsensual modification
of obligations owed to out-of-state creditors as an “impairment” of
their contractual rights.52 State law might (and in most cases did) set
out a procedure that would allow creditors to levy upon personal
property or foreclose on real property, but a state would lack the
power to put in place a single procedure that would allow creditors
to foreclose on all the assets of the railroad and still keep it running
52

See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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as a going concern. Among other things, a state court had no power
to control the disposition of land located in another state.
Congress had the power to create such a procedure under the
bankruptcy clause, but in the 1880s and early 1890s there was no
federal bankruptcy law. Congress had enacted three earlier statutes,
but they had all been controversial and they had each been repealed.
Hence, the railroad investors had no ability to file for federal
bankruptcy. Given the absence of other alternatives, the representatives of the investors took advantage of the equity receivership.
The equity receivership emerged in courts of equity. In these
courts, a judge has the equitable power to appoint a receiver to take
control of a litigant’s assets. In recent years, federal courts have used
the equity receivership to take control of a prison system that violated the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmates or a school
system that ignored the 14th Amendment. In the typical case, the
plaintiffs are creditors and the receiver comes into control of the
property of the debtor. As these other examples suggest, the procedure is flexible. Lawyers for the creditors of troubled railroads, with
the blessing of sympathetic judges, took advantage of the equity receivership.53 As they used it over time, their practices became more
fixed as judges set limits on how these receiverships could be used
and how they could change the rights of the various affected parties.
What emerged in the end were the basic features of Chapter 11.
The following is a stylized example of an equity receivership.54 A
railroad has 100,000 shares of stock outstanding. It owes $150
million, $50 million to three different groups of bondholders. The
first loan of $50 million was used to build the main line, the second
to build the terminal, and the third to build a line connecting the
terminal to a port. The remaining creditors are suppliers and a few
others whose loans are unsecured. The railroad cannot meet
payments on the $150 million of debt. Indeed, the railroad is worth
less than the $100 million. The railroad defaults on its fixed obliga53
For a personal account of what the lawyers did in the equity receiverships, see Robert Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors (1948). For a
more general account of the work of lawyers, investment bankers and other
professionals, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice i n
the Age of American Enterprise, 1870– 1920, in Gerald Geison, Professions
and Professional Ideologies in America (1983).
54
The following is drawn from Baird (1993).
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tions and the investment bankers representing the three groups of
bondholders realize that the time has come to restructure the firm.
The investors call upon their lawyers and their investment
bankers. The lawyers persuade a general creditor to ask a federal
court to appoint a receiver for the railroad. The receiver the court appoints is often the group of manager-shareholders that has been
running the railroad. The receiver pays off all the suppliers in full
and keeps the railroad running. In the meantime, lawyers and the
investment bankers form four committees, representing the three
classes of bondholders and the equityholders. Each bondholders’
committee persuades most of the bondholders to deposit their bonds
with it and give it the power to assert all the rights of the bondholders in the reorganization. Let us assume that, in our case, 90
percent of the bondholders in each class give their bonds to their
committee.
The four committees then meet and create a new committee,
the reorganization committee, on which members of each of the
other committees sit and which is empowered to act on behalf of
the other committees. The reorganization committee now controls
90 percent of all outstanding securities. It then proceeds to form a
plan of reorganization. In this case, the reorganization committee
must decide first how much each group of bondholders should
receive and then what a new capital structure should look like.
In our case, each group might insist on an equal share, given
that each invested $50 million. On the other hand, some of the
investments might have been less successful. For example, if the line
connecting the terminal to the port had not brought much business,
the representatives of the two other committees might be able to
insist on a larger share. In the typical case, the plan might reduce the
rate of interest, make interest payments contingent upon income,
convert debt to preferred stock, reduce the amount of principal, or
extend the term of the loan.55
To keep things simple, let us assume that this plan provided that
each group of bondholders reduce their claims by 40% and for the
new bonds to be secured by all three assets. Each $1,000 bond
secured by one of the three assets will be exchanged for a $600 bond
55
In the case of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, 30-year 6% bonds
originally due in 1911 became 100-year 4% bonds due in 1995.
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secured by all of the railroad’s assets. The shareholders who turned
over their shares to the committee are given the option to exchange
an old share of stock and $15 for a new share of stock. Through
their representatives on the reorganization committee, the
participating creditors and shareholders consent to this plan.
The reorganization committee then borrows $15 million from a
bank on a short-term basis. At this point, the receiver conducts a
foreclosure sale in which the assets of the railroad are sold to the
highest bidder. Although the foreclosure sale is nominally open to
anyone, in practice the reorganization committee usually turns out
to be the only bidder. It bids $15 million, $5 million for the main
line, the terminal, and the connecting line respectively. The receiver
takes the $15 million and distributes it to the bondholders. Because
the reorganization committee itself owns 90 percent of the bonds,
the receiver gives back to the reorganization committee $13.5
million of the $15 million the committee paid to buy the railroad.
The receiver pays the other $1.5 million to the nonparticipating
bondholders who did not give their bonds to the reorganization
committee.56 The shareholders get none of the proceeds because the
sale price was not enough to pay the bondholders, who enjoyed a
higher priority, in full.
After the foreclosure sale, the old corporation is a hollow shell
and the old shareholders dissolve it under state law. Because the legal
entity that was the railroad now no longer exists, all claims against it
are worthless. Hence any shareholders who did not turn over their
rights to the relevant committee are out of luck, as are any general
creditors.
At this point, the reorganization committee has the assets of the
railroad and the $13.5 million it received from the receiver. The
committee now forms a new corporation and transfers all the assets
of the railroad to it. The new corporation creates $90 million in
bonds and gives them to the old participating bondholders as
56
Recall that ten percent of the bondholders did not participate. Hence,
each of the bondholders who did not participate receives only 10 cents on the
dollar, much less than they would have received if they had participated in the
reorganization in which they would have received 60 cents on the dollar. The
device of the nominally open foreclosure sale in the equity receivership is what
allowed the freezing out nonparticipating bondholders and hence largely
eliminated the holdout problem of the common law composition.

THE HIDDEN VIRTUES

OF

CHAPTER 11

27

promised in the reorganization plan. All the stock in the new firm is
given to the old shareholders when they come up with the $1.5
million in cash they promised in the reorganization plan. With this
$1.5 million and the $13.5 million the receiver gave it, the committee repays the $15 million bank loan. The reorganization
committee now goes out of existence.
If we focus entirely on legal forms, we see a new corporation
with a new set of ownership claims against it. In substance,
however, the story is quite different. If one collapses the various steps
in this elaborate dance, most of the bondholders and shareholders
have simply exchanged their old claims against the firm for new
ones that take better account of the condition in which the railroad
finds itself. We have exactly the same railroad with the same
managers and the same investors, but the ownership rights of the
investors have been adjusted so that they are in line with the revenue
that the railroad actually earns.
The evolution of the equity receivership is similar in form to
evolution we see elsewhere in commercial law. The clarity of the
legal rules matters as much as their content. Moreover, the rights
the legal regime grants need to bind not only the parties, but third
parties as well. For this reason, it was entirely predictable that
investors would turn to a vehicle such as the equity receivership to
solve the problems they confronted. To ensure that the reorganization provided ownership rights that everyone would recognize, they
needed some legal device that could give clear title.57
The strong tradition of dual sovereignty, the contracts clause and
Congress’s failure to enact a bankruptcy law created an environment
in which rational investors would turn to the equity receivership as a
way to reorganize an insolvent firm. Rational investors of 19th
Century railroads would want an equity receivership if other alternatives existed. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the equity
receivership had some virtues that made it particularly well suited to
sorting out the rights of investors in 19th Century railroads. First,
the committee structure and the process of bargaining among the
57

One of the great issues in the law of equity receiverships concerned the
hoops through which one had to jump to ensure that all the creditors of the
old railroad were bound. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S.
482 (1913).
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different committees was ideal for an insolvent firm that had a
complex capital structures. Market-based mechanisms for establishing the rights of different investors are hard to devise when the
ownership rights are not hierarchical.
In the case of the railroads, the operations of the firm and the
problems with the capital structure could be cleanly separated from
one another. These were the first firms in which we see a clean
separation between the providers of capital and those who ran the
day-to-day operations. A relatively drawn-out legal process that
follows an elaborate set of negotiations is less costly if the problems
associated with fixing the firm’s capital structure can be readily
separated from the operational issues.
Moreover, these firms were large and capital markets were far
less developed than they are today. The lack of reliance on marketmechanisms to determine the value of the firm is less troubling if
there are doubts about the ability of a sale to attract bidders. In any
event, the equity receivership had an actual market sale that was, in
theory, open to outsiders. It is a feature that contrasts with Chapter
11 in which there is no mandate that requires bids from outsiders to
be considered.58
The problems that the great railroads faced in the late 19th
Century may allow us to speculate why the law of the United States
evolved towards Chapter 11 and the law of other jurisdictions did
not. Laws that work relatively well may be hard to displace, even if a
legislature might adopt a radically different regime if writing on a
blank slate. Other jurisdictions may lack a legal regime resembling
Chapter 11 because they did not have the need for something like
the equity receivership at an earlier time. These other jurisdictions
may not have had the lacuna in its legal system such as the one in
United States law because of dual sovereignty. A coherent set of laws
might have already addressed the rights of creditors and other
investors.
58
There were, however, no outside bidders in the railroad equity
receiverships. The committees could bid their claims and outsiders may have
lacked both the capital and the information needed to bid against them.
Similarly, it is possible to make too much of the absence of market mechanisms
under current law. Able judges today would rarely ignore a credible outside bid
and march forward with a forced sale over the objections of senior creditors.
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Second, other jurisdictions did not need as much capital and may
not have relied so heavily or private capital for the construction of
railroads. When they did, the investors may have been less distant
and less diffuse. Third, the railroads were generally smaller, and,
because the railroads were built later, their capital structures may
have been simpler. Complex capital structures are most likely to exist
in an era of massive regulatory and technological change. Railroads
in other jurisdictions may have learned from the United States
experience. For all these reasons, there was no need for something
akin to the equity receivership and hence nothing out of which a
regime analogous to Chapter 11 might evolve.
The development of the law between the age of the great
railroad reorganizations in the late 19th Century and the enactment
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code may have several additional lessons for
us. The Chandler Act and other legislation in the 1930s introduced
and codified features that came into being after the equity receivership began to be applied to many other kinds of firms. Two routes
became available, Chapter XI and Chapter X respectively. Each,
however, was more limited than the equity receivership had been.
Under Chapter XI, the managers remained in control, but they
lacked the ability to restructure secured debt. Under Chapter X,
secured debt could be restructured, but the management of the firm
came into the hands of a trustee. (A receiver displaced the managers
in an equity receivership in principle, but in practice the receiver was
the existing management or closely allied with it.)
These changes may have came about because they were thought
necessary to protect investors. They were widely dispersed, and lawmakers thought that these investors had little ability to monitor the
directors and managers who were also often large shareholders.59
During the time of the great railroad reorganizations, these fears
were likely misplaced. The need of the insiders to return to the same
sources of capital in the future should have done much to ensure
59
See Douglas (1937). This multi-volume work was done under William
O. Douglas’s auspices while he was a Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. They reflect the thinking of New Deal lawyers active
in the creation of the Chandler Act and the other bankruptcy legislation of the
1930s. While serving on the Supreme Court, Douglas made important contributions to the absolute priority rule in such opinions as Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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that they were loyal fiduciaries. The survival after a century of the
law firm (Cravath) and the bank (J.P. Morgan) most involved in
these cases further suggests that they worked with the long term in
view.
By the 1930s, however, the same forces might not have worked
as effectively. In the case of closely held firms in which the
managers are also the holders of the equity, the problems Douglas
addressed are considerably magnified. These problems have also been
closely studied in recent years.60 Smaller firms with hierarchical
capital structures may incur large agency costs.61 Loan covenants can
minimize some of these problems, such as the danger of the
manager-owners issuing debt senior to that of existing creditors.62
Fraudulent conveyance law controls the manager-owners’ temptation to remove assets from corporate solution. The problems of overand underinvestment, however, are less tractable.63 Manager-owners
may favor risky projects and ignore safe ones. An owner-manager of
a firm that has debt of $100 and assets of $10 has no incentive to
make an investment that is certain to bring a return of $20, but does
have the incentive to invest in a project will return more than $100,
even if the risks do not justify it.
We must also take account of the effects of bankruptcy even
when the firm is not financially distressed. A reorganization procedure that gives managers a soft landing may reduce their incentives
to maximize the value of the firm before the fact, but, if they are risk
averse, a soft landing may be desirable nevertheless.64 There are
additional complications as well. Before the firm is in financial
distress, manager-owners may have the incentive to overinvest in
firm-specific capital. By doing this, the manager-owners can
entrench themselves, but it may also reduce their incentives to make
themselves indispensable.65
These agency problems, however, are easy to overstate for large
firms. Douglas, like Berle and Means, may not have understood the
60

See Gertner & Scharfstein (1991); Rasmussen (1994).
See Jensen & Meckling (1976); Meyers (1977).
62
See Smith & Warner (1979).
63
See Rose-Ackerman (1991); White (1993).
64
See White (1993). A general discussion of this problem can be found i n
Hölmstrom (1982).
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See Bebchuk & Picker (1993).
61

THE HIDDEN VIRTUES

OF

CHAPTER 11

31

market for corporate control and other mechanisms that kept
managers and other insiders in line even when there was a
separation of ownership and control.66 In any event, the rule
changes that Douglas and others spear-headed are likely responsible
for the decline in the importance of corporate reorganizations for
large firms until the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which expanded the
role that managers had in a reorganization. A procedure, whether
good or bad, is never going to be used unless someone has an
incentive to invoke it. If a reorganization regime dislodges managers,
we should not be surprised if they do not use it. If managers will not
begin the proceeding, incentives must exist so that someone else
does.67
VI. CHAPTER 11 THROUGH THE LENS OF THE EQUITY
RECEIVERSHIP
The equity receivership was a sensible way for investors in a 19th
Century insolvent railway to sort out their rights, given the legal and
economic conditions in which they found themselves and the other
choices that were available to them. The problems of the 19th
Century railroads, however, seem radically different from the problems insolvent firms face today. The economic and regulatory
environments are not the same. The bizarre capital structure of
multiple kinds of secured debt no longer exists. Capital markets are
much more developed. Finally, few firms have assets whose value is
so linked to the continuation of the firm as a going concern.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, there may be firms that
share the same essential characteristics as the insolvent railroads of
the 19th Century. Many firms have complex capital structures. The
neat pattern of layered debt and equity that we see in finance texts is
not pervasive. For a firm of any size, there is no simple way to gain a
blanket priority over all the assets. A separate mortgage must be
recorded for every piece of real property. A single security agreement
can embrace all of a debtor’s personal property, but a creditor enjoys a
priority with respect to them only if proper public filings are made.
In most cases, there needs to be one (and sometimes multiple
66
Douglas does explicitly rely on Berle & Means (1933) in his study of
equity receiverships. See, e.g., Douglas (1937) at Part I, p. 5 n.4.
67
See Baird (1991); White (1993).
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filings) in each jurisdiction in which property is located. Sometimes
other creditors need to be notified. A constant vigilance may need to
be kept for tax liens. Special techniques are needed to ensure priority
over cash proceeds and securities. In addition, creditors are likely to
find holes in their priority positions with respect to property
(including inventory or receivables) that the firm receives while it is
insolvent.68 It is not uncommon for reorganizations to focus much
of their attention on the resolution of these issues.
The traditional balance sheet no longer identifies many of the
important creditors in a bankruptcy case. High technology firms
have intellectual property disputes with their principal competitor.
The dispute might take several years to litigate, but the expected
liability may approach the value of the firm. Putting a value on the
rights of the competitor is not easy.69 Many firms have long-term
leases of real property. The lessor may have invested substantial
amounts in customizing the building for the debtor and obligations
under the lease may be tied to the revenues of the firm.
Understanding the relative rights and obligations of the parties is
hard.70 The lease is both an asset and a liability for the debtor.
A firm may have a long-term relationship with a supplier or a
buyer. These relationships themselves can be both assets and
liabilities. Even in the absence of a contract between the two firms,
the relationship can be one that looms large in any reorganization of
a firm. If a firm has invested large resources in developing a custom
part for one of its buyers, the success of any reorganization may turn
on what happens to this relationship, especially if the other firm has
patented the part or if the manufacturing process is a trade secret.
This asset is similarly one that is hard to value.
Many manufacturing firms face potential environmental
liabilities under state and federal laws. Even a firm that put only a
small amount of its waste product at a dump site in full compliance
68

These problems are the domain of fraudulent conveyance law and the law
of voidable preferences. See 11 U.S.C. §§547 & 548.
69
For a case that gives some sense of the problems of dealing with creditors
who have contingent claims, see Bittner v. Borne Chemical Co., 691 F.2d 134
(3d Cir. 1982).
70
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code tells us what happens to leases in a
reorganization. It is both one of the most complicated and one of the least
successful parts of the Bankruptcy Code.

THE HIDDEN VIRTUES

OF

CHAPTER 11

33

with all applicable laws may find itself facing joint and several
liability for the clean-up costs that again equals or exceeds its net
worth. Firms may face tax liabilities that must be litigated.
Regulatory liability is increasingly common and often spreads across
corporate entities. A parent firm may be responsible for obligations
of its subsidiary, even though garden-variety creditors would not be
able to pierce the corporate veil.
A complete picture of the capital structure of a firm often requires capturing accurately relationships that are more complicated
than that of identifying creditors along such straightforward dimensions as how much they are owed and what priority they enjoy.
In addition, the more complicated a firm’s capital structure, the
harder it will be to write a completely specified contract. Ideally, the
contract that the investors write sets out the rights of all the players
under all possible states of the firm in a way that maximizes the value
of the firm’s assets.
Most investment contracts fail to set out the rights of the parties
in a way that anticipates all the ways in which things can go wrong.
Moreover, the loan documents may not even provide for the rights
and obligations of the parties in many of the situations that arise
when the firm fails. The reorganization is necessary because the
world has changed in a way that is unanticipated. The problem of
corporate reorganizations looms largest in industries in which there
is rapid technological and legal change. It is precisely in these cases
where contractual solutions before the fact are least likely to be
adequate.
Chapter 11 is easiest to justify and is most interesting where the
problems that the investors face at the time of the reorganization is
one that they could not have identified at the time of their original
investments. Many of the industries that went through reorganization over the last hundred years have been industries in which there
was rapid economic, technological and regulatory change.71 The
great railroads were created before anyone had experience with how
giant firms should be capitalized. They matured just at the time of
one of the country’s great economic depressions and at a time when
they were increasingly becoming subject to regulation. The utility
71
The shopping center reorganizations of the late 1980s are a conspicuous
exception to this general rule.
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reorganizations of the 1930s, as well as the airline reorganizations of
the 1980s that come in the wake of deregulation and the invention
of the hub-and-spoke system tell a similar story.
Many firms need a forum such as Chapter 11 if only to ensure
that there is some mechanism that allows there to be a reorganization that can give clean title to the investors on the scene after the
reorganization is over. Prepackaged bankruptcies have become
commonplace in recent years in large part because the bankruptcy
court can bless the reorganization and give all the new participants
clear title. This matters not only in complicated regulatory environments, but also with respect to secured creditors who in theory
possess a priority interest in all the debtor’s assets, but can assert these
rights outside of bankruptcy only by invoking foreclosure procedures
in all the jurisdictions in which the firm has real property.
The title-clearing function of Chapter 11 is one of its most
important. Because of the long tradition of dual sovereignty in the
United States, the existence of such a forum continues to matter.
Even if a market sale makes sense, a market sale is going to bring
maximum value to the owners of the firm only if the person
conducting the sale can warrant good title. A bankruptcy judge under Chapter 11 has the power to do this in a way that few others do.
The first phase of the equity receivership often was spent
reviewing the books of the firms and finding out what the earnings
of the railroad were.72 Chapter 11, like the equity receivership, allows
creditors to gather information in a way that they could not
otherwise. First, the creditors as a group can have an expert
appointed to act on their behalf. Second, the court has the power to
sanction anyone who falsifies information or simply fails to turn it
over. Just as granting clear title is a function Chapter 11 serves that is
hard to replicate contractually, so too is this information gathering
role. We do, of course, see legal regimes in which firms are required
to gather and turn over information (the take-over market is the
72
To return to our basic case, the dynamics of the second reorganization of
the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe discussed earlier changed dramatically
when the investors discovered that the railroad had been offering secret rebates
to their shippers and failed to report these rebates on the balance sheet. See
Daggett at 208-10.
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most conspicuous), but even here the mechanism works effectively
because of judicial oversight.
Finally, Chapter 11 allows for ways to overcome the collective
action problems that might otherwise exist with diverse creditors.73
To be sure, investors can create mechanisms among themselves that
largely eliminate these problems among ordinary private consensual
creditors,74 but in a regulatory state, those with rights against the
firm will include many who are not ordinary investors, but may be
government agencies. Those with the power to bind an agency may
be hard to bring to the bargaining table in the absence of a legal
forum that mandates it. The court mechanism also gives ordinary
creditors a way to bring different government agencies to the
bargaining table.
Understanding the potential virtues of Chapter 11 might best be
seen by examining the situation in which investors in the health
care industry will soon find themselves in the United States.75 The
next decade will be a time of massive regulatory and technological
change. Procedures that once required weeks of hospitalization will
become out-patient procedures. Insurance companies are becoming
owners of health maintenance organizations. Large hospitals are
entering into alliances with physician groups and other health care
providers.
The capital demands of the industry are enormous. Hospitals
must build new facilities to accommodate the expanding outpatient
practice. These buildings will have no other use, nor will the multimillion dollar pieces of equipment that will be installed in them.
The structure of the industry is rapidly changing.
As in the case of the railroads in the 1890s, there are many
mergers, and many firms are forming alliances and relationships
with one another. Until we reach a new equilibrium, it will be often
hard to understand the capital structure of each firm. It is not clear
in many cases who owns what or which firm enjoys favorable
73
The collective action problem that diverse creditors face when a firm
encounters financial distress has long been one of the central themes of the law
and economics of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Bulow & Shoven (1979); Jackson
(1982). For an empirical study of the bargaining dynamics between
bondholders and banks, see Asquith, Gertner & Scharfstein (1994).
74
See Picker (1992).
75
Warren & Sage (1994).
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contracts or has the right to the services of particular groups of
doctors and surgeons. If different groups pool resources to acquire
multi-million dollar machines for magnetic image resonance and
the like.
How the rights of investors in these different health-care firms
will be unraveled when one or more becomes insolvent remains
unknown. This arena does not seem to be one in which investors
can anticipate all the problems they are likely to encounter and
provide for them in their loan contracts. Some heath-care firms will
fail, and when they fail, investors will need a forum in which
relevant information can be gathered. They will need a forum in
which ownership of the various assets can be fixed. The forum will
also be one that can force all the players, including recalcitrant
government bureaucrats to sit down and negotiate with each other.
The infra-structure of Chapter 11 will handle these problems
well, in large measure because they are the same problems that
railroads faced in the late 19th Century. A bankruptcy judge can
oversee a reorganization, ensure the relevant information is gathered,
confront the regulatory complexities, bring all the players to the
bargaining table, sort out their rights, and give the new owners clear
title to a new entity whose capital structure is more suited to the
needs of the industry, whatever they prove to be.
VII. UNBUNDLING CHAPTER 11
Chapter 11 may be able to sort out the problems of firms with
complex capital structures. When such firms find themselves in the
midst of a economic downturn confronting rapid regulatory and
technological change, contractual alternatives may not work well.
The question remains, however, whether Chapter 11 possesses any
special virtues to handle these problems that one could not also find
in a more traditional legal regime in which a court oversees a liquidation of the firm. These courts may also be able to perform the
same functions. A regime based on the equity receivership can
preserve going concerns because it effectively solves collective action
problems, facilitates the gathering of information, and ensures clear
title, but other legal regimes may be able to do this as well.
To say that investors opt for the equity receivership and modern
Chapter 11 is only to say that they are better than the other alterna-
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tives that United States law provides. Other legal regimes might be
as good or even better. More to the point, the differences between
the essential characteristics of Chapter 11 and liquidation regimes
are much smaller than typically imagined.76 Once the rhetoric is put
to one side and the idiocies of modern Chapter 11 are corrected, the
differences between a legal regime in which a judge oversees a
liquidation and a judge oversees a Chapter 11-style reorganization
may turn more on the ability of the judge than anything else.
Although Chapter 11 has a hypothetical sale as the norm, a
Chapter 11 judge has the power to oversee a sale of the assets as a
going concern if one of the parties requests it. A judge who squarely
focuses on sorting out the rights of the investors and choosing the
course that is most likely to promote their interests will not behave
much differently from a judge overseeing a liquidation. Each should
be willing to sell the firm to third parties or existing investors in a
way that is in the best interests of all concerned.
The judge in Chapter 11, however, is invested with enormous
discretion. Moreover, the federal court system allows those who
initiate the Chapter 11 (typically the managers of the firm and the
firm’s reorganization lawyers) to pick the forum in which the cases
will be heard. The Eastern Airlines bankruptcy bears the case name
“In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.” Ionosphere Clubs was a subsidiary of
Eastern that ran its departure lounges. Because Ionosphere was a
New York corporation, it was possible to file its Chapter 11 petition
in the Southern District of New York. Once it filed, all the related
corporations, including the airline itself, could join it. For similar
reasons, the LTV bankruptcy is called “In re Chateaugay Corp.”
Many important reorganizations have fallen into the laps of judges
who have reputations for being generous in giving managers a
second chance and in awarding generous fees to their lawyers and
advisors.77 By contrast, the equity receiverships tended to be initiated
and controlled by those who represented the various bondholders,
the residual owners of the firm.
Corporate law in the United States has been successful because
of competition among different jurisdictions. The biggest challenge
facing any legal system that emulates Chapter 11 may not be so
76

See LoPucki and Triantis (1993).
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much to create the mechanism that ensures that the judge acts in a
way that vindicates the wishes of the investors. Once the law of
corporate reorganization invests judges with extraordinary discretion,
one of the large challenges is creating a system in which the judges
are able and that the party that begins the proceeding has an
incentive to pick the judge who is most likely to look after the
interests of the investors as a whole.
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